











we	might	even	say	 that	man’s	ability	 to	deceive	himself	about	everything	 from	sexual	
desire	to	death,	is	what	fundamentally	distinguishes	him.	And	this	is	not,	as	Morris	has	
suggested,	 merely	 some	 idiosyncrasy	 that	 might	 occur	 ‘from	 time	 to	 time’2.	 In	 other	







significance,	 an	 analysis	 of	 self‐deception	 has	 not	 served	 as	 a	 more	 common	 and	
productive	starting	point	for	grasping	the	nature	of	the	self.	For	whilst,	of	course,	much	
work	has	been	done	on	both	self‐deception	and	selfhood	separately,	the	two	have	rarely	












































addressing	 the	 problem	 of	 how	 self‐deception	 is	 possible	 we	 would	 seek	 to	 reveal	
something	new	and	distinctive	 about	 our	understanding	of	 the	 self.	And	 certainly	 the	
Freudian	resolution	to	the	problem	appears	to	offer	precisely	just	that.	This	is	because	


















both	of	 the	 repression	and,	 as	 it	 is	 connected	 to	 consciousness,	 ignorant	 of	 the	 act	 of	
repression.	 Thus	 in	 this	 way	we	 are	 back	 with	 the	 puzzle	 of	 self‐deception.	 For	 it	 is	







deception	 on	 the	 model	 of	 paradigmatic	 interpersonal	 deception	 is	 fundamentally	
misguided.’7	That	is,	for	them,	puzzles	of	‘self‐deception’	stem	from	illegitimately	framing	
the	 phenomenon	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 deceiver‐deceived	 relation	 of	 the	 ordinary	 lie.	 And	
Canfield	and	Gustafson	are	typical	in	this	regard.	For	they	argue	that	‘All	that	happens	in	
self‐deception…	 is	 that	 the	 person	 believes	 or	 forgets	 something	 in	 [belief	 adverse]	


























case	 we	 have	 a	 spurious	 belief	 accrued	 and	 cemented	 potentially	 over	 many	 years,	
whereas	with	the	other	we	have	an	immediate	act	of	distraction	from	something	that	is	
all	too	present.	And	in	this	sense	it	is	evident	here	that	something	essential	has	not	been	
dealt	 with.	 In	 sum,	 it	 is	 apparent	 that	 the	 deflationary	 accounts	 have	 resolved	 the	
paradoxes	only	by	ignoring	a	significant	part	of	the	meaning	of	self‐deception.	
So	 is	 there	 another	 possibility?	 Is	 there	 an	 alternative	 beyond	 the	 Freudian	 or	
deflationary	answers	to	the	puzzle	of	self‐deception?	And	thus	is	there	another	way	of	
using	an	analysis	of	how	self‐deception	is	possible	to	shed	light	on	the	self?		Before	we	










things.’12	 In	 other	words,	we	 can	 be	 aware	 of	 different	 aspects	 of	 an	 activity,	 and	 its	



















Consequently	we	 can	 say,	 on	 this	 basis,	we	 can	 then	deceive	ourselves	without	being	
entangled	in	paradox.	For	if	we	can	withhold	attention	from	an	intentional	object	in	pre‐
reflective	 awareness	 that	 is	 of	 obvious	 potential	 reflective	 interest	 to	 us,	we	 are	 self‐
deceiving.	Yet	as	all	this	occurs	without	our	ever	being	reflectively	aware	of	the	thing	we	
are	avoiding	then	there	is	also	no	obvious	paradox	involved.	In	short,	there	is	no	paradox	















































Thus,	 continuing	 our	 description,	 in	 this	way	 the	woman	 disarms	 the	 situation	 of	 its	
worrying,	 transcendent,	 aspect	 and	 evades	 the	 decision	 which	 this	 transcendence	





































Concluding	 then,	 the	 coquette	 succeeds	 here,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 other	 two	 devices,	 in	






our	 discussion,	 has	 been	 gleaned	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 this	 phenomenon	 from	 such	 a	
description?	To	take	the	former	questions	first,	we	can	say	that	the	woman	is	in	a	state	of	
self‐deception	because	she	hides	 from	herself	 something	at	 the	very	moment	 that	she	
brings	it	to	attention.	So	for	instance,	in	the	case	of	the	man’s	conduct,	she	reduces	it	to	
being	 only	 its	 immanent	 meaning	 precisely	 because	 she	 is	 aware	 of	 its	 threatening	

































































but	 an	 ideal	 of	 being.’	 (BN,	 59)	 In	 other	 words,	 sincerity	 is	 not,	 as	 much	 of	 the	







He	 comes	 toward	 the	patrons	with	a	 step	a	 little	 too	quick.	He	bends	
forward	a	little	too	eagerly;	his	voice,	his	eyes	express	an	interest	a	little	
too	 solicitous	 for	 the	 order	 of	 the	 customer.	 Finally	 there	 he	 returns,	
trying	 to	 imitate	 in	 his	 walk	 the	 inflexible	 stiffness	 of	 some	 kind	 of	
automaton	while	carrying	his	tray	with	the	recklessness	of	a	tight	rope‐





























itself?	 We	 can	 begin	 to	 answer	 this	 question	 by	 observing	 that	 although	 this	 is	 a	
particularly	explicit	case	of	the	project	of	sincerity	it	is	by	no	means	exceptional.	In	other	












Sartre	 when	 he	 says,	 regarding	 the	 waiter,	 that	 ‘He	 knows	 well	 what	 it	 ‘means:’	 the	



















(Ibid)	And	 in	 this	way	we	can	say	 that	my	non‐being	 is	defined	precisely	by	a	certain	






we	are	 absent	 from	 in	 this	way	 is	 not	merely	 the	 ‘ideals’	 of	 particular	public	 roles	 or	









‘ideal’	 of	 being	 applies	 to	 our	 emotions.	 As	 he	 says,	 citing	melancholy	 here,	 ‘sadness	




‘haunts	 my	 consciousness.’	 However,	 as	 with	 the	 ‘ideal’	 of	 the	 waiter,	 my	 sadness	 is	










is	 is	 universally	 impossible.	 And	 further,	 we	 can	 say,	 this	 impossibility	 is	 part	 of	 the	


























carefully	 enough,	 that	 I	 cannot	 be	 genuinely	 sincere	 about	 any	 of	my	 beliefs.	 For	we	

















the	 role	 of	 ‘believing’,	 but	 always	 find	 ourselves	 as	 already,	 imperceptibly,	 having	
  70
surpassed	 it.	 And	 moreover,	 this	 seems	 to	 be	 something	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 intuit	 in	
experience.	For	whilst	a	full	elaboration	of	this	point	depends	upon	further	analysis	of	
‘non‐being’,	we	can	say	that	this	is	something	a	sensitive	phenomenology	of	belief	is	still	

























discourage	me	 since	 every	 belief	 involves	 not	 quite	 believing.	 I	 shall	
define	this	impossible	belief	as	my	belief.	(BN,	69)	
In	other	words,	to	start,	what	we	have	as	with	the	coquette	is	two	different	senses	of	‘non‐
belief’,	or	 ‘impossible	belief.’	First	of	all	 then	there	 is	the	ordinary	sense	of	 impossible	
  71
belief,	something	I	know	in	the	more	mundane	sense	not	to	be	the	case.	That	is,	there	is	











All	 particular	 beliefs	 thus	 now	 become	 equally	 impossible.	 However	 then,	 having	
destroyed	ordinary	belief	by	seeing	it	in	terms	of	sincere	belief	it	now	moves	back	to	the	





























a	 level	 prior	 to	 reflective	 awareness.	 And,	 as	 well	 as	 what	 we	 desire,	 say	 avoiding	 a	






of	 existing	 in	 this	 ambiguous	 liminal	 state	 of	 flight	 we	 can	 utilise	 this	 to	 maintain	
contradictions.	What	this	means	is	that	if	we	exist	without	substance,	perpetually	caught	
between	definite	modes	of	being,	then	we	are	implicitly	aware	of	the	difficulty	of	properly	
















by	 looking	 at	 some	 familiar	 responses	 to	 the	 problem.	 As	 such	we	 encountered,	 and	
rejected,	 the	 Freudian	 and	 deflationary	 accounts	 respectively.	 Likewise,	 though	 an	
advance,	Fingarette’s	approach,	based	on	the	idea	that	‘we	can	take	account	of	something	













with	 himself	 that	 allowed	 self‐deception	 to	 take	 place.	 Assuming	 therefore	 that	 ‘non‐
identity’	might	hold	the	key	to	grasping	self‐deception,	we	thus	next	looked	at	sincerity.	
This	was	because,	as	Sartre	said,	 ‘examination	of	the	idea	of	sincerity,	the	antithesis	of	




Furthermore	we	did	 this	by	 looking	at	 another	 concrete	 example.	 In	other	words,	we	
looked	at	the	instance	of	sincerity	wherein	a	waiter	is	‘playing	at	being	a	waiter	in	a	cafe.’	
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